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ADA DIALLA
GREEK PERCEPTIONS 
OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905
“Russia overcoming Russia”
The Greek perceptions of the 1905 Russian Revolution as it unfolded have so far
not been a focus of study, not even by Greek historians. This is somewhat
surprising for at the time, “1905” was viewed in Greece, as elsewhere in Europe
and beyond, as a shattering world event so consequential as to be compared with the
French Revolution. Even a cursory glance at the Athenian press of that year readily
shows that the 1905 nationwide upheaval in Russia—the legitimacy crisis of
tsarism and the Empire triggered by the 1905 defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of
1905 that led to mass rallies and clashes, which engulfed all aspects of the social
and political life of the country — captured the interest and imagination of Greek
public opinion as few other international events had done. 
The aim of the present article is first of all to register the reactions of the Greek
public, in themselves spontaneous and multifaceted, to the momentous events in
Russia. In so doing, we will try to contextualize the debate on “1905” in the Greek
setting, by discerning the underlying discourses involved, taking into consideration
the specificities of the Kingdom of Greece at that historical juncture, its self-image
as a state and a society, including its national identity and historical vision.
We will approach our subject matter by using three mainstream Athenian
dailies, all three with a wide circulation, the liberal Acropolis, the enlightened
conservative Embros and the mildly conservative Scrip. 
In the course of 1905, the Greek press devoted almost every day a whole page to
the external and internal difficulties faced by tsarist Russia. The pages in question,
rarely editorials or large articles, are for the most part short informative texts, in what
was apparently a conscious attempt at presenting events as dispassionately and
factually as possible. These mostly laconic texts, all placed within one page like
pieces of a puzzle, attempted to provide a comprehensive presentation of what was
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taking place in Russia. Their sources of information were for the most part European
press agencies and, to a lesser extent, the Athenian Press Agency’s office in St.
Petersburg. There are also many translations of articles from a number of European
dailies, notably The Daily Telegraph and The Times of London, Le Matin of Paris,
the Russian Novoe Vremia as well as from the German and Austrian press.
This way of producing and disseminating information gave the news in question
a pan-European dimension. This element, together with the extrovert Western-
orientated character of the Greek press, placed Greek public opinion within the
wider pan-European public debates that had come to the fore in the course of the
nineteenth century with the explosion of journalism. From this angle of vision, the
study of the press opens up a new perspective, namely a comparative approach of
European perceptions of the Russian Revolution of 1905, where one can detect
common themes of interest and common attitudes as well as recurring divergences. 
As it is generally accepted today, press reports and articles, however avowedly
factual, do not simply transmit a news item, but are also in the business of
“constructing” the news in question, be it simply by the choice of style and
expression or the selection of events being highlighted.1 In spite of the short content
of most of the press texts published in Athens, the words that were used, together
with the titles chosen to top the text, and not least the culture of the image and the
photograph, conveyed a particular message to the information in question. In the
course of 1905, one sees in the Greek press, for all its attempts at impersonal
dispassionate presentation, a dramatic narrative, full of suspense as to how the
whole story will end after all, replete with harrowing descriptions of wretchedness,
repression and blood-letting, and presenting a sort of ghastly “numbers-lust” as to
the exact number of killed persons at each clash. The newspapers seem to rival each
other in their attempt at conveying the drama as vividly as possible. This is often
done, not surprisingly, at the expense of objective reporting.2 
In the Russian turmoil as it unfolded throughout 1905, events, as it is well
known, changed dramatically, almost on a daily basis. The historical actors were
many, each one following his own agenda: workers, farmers, students, soldiers,
intellectuals, monarchists, liberals, radical and socialist political parties, national
minorities, the government, the tsar…3 In the Greek press one can detect, on several
occasions, vagueness and puzzlement as regards the main actors involved: who the
main actors really were, what their true objectives were, what the wider and long-
term consequences of their actions were. And at times, the Greek press, immersed
as it was in details of the events, does not seem to understand what was really at
stake in Russia in 1905. 
1. See Peter Dahlgren-Colin Sparks, eds., Journalism and Popular Culture, London: Sage, 1992.
2. “Ta neotera tou europaikou tahydromiou” [The news of the European postoffice], Scrip,
21 January 1905, p. 4.
3. Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray, Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1988; Id., The Revolution of 1905. Authority Restored, Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1992; Politicheskie partii Rossii. Konets XIX–pervaia tret´ XX v. Entsiklopediia Moscow,
1996. S.V. Tiutiukin, Desiat´ let v zhurnale otechestvennaia istoriia, Moscow: Sobranie, 2005. 
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Revolution or reform?
At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, Greece followed a policy of “benevolent
neutrality,” according to the assessment of Iu. Ia. Solov´ev, the then secretary of
the Russian legation in Athens. But when it came to providing practical assistance
to Russia, Greece put neutrality aside, according to Solov´ev, as evidenced by the
fact that the Russian warships anchored indefinitely in the port of Piraeus during the
war. This was made easier by the lack of diplomatic relations between Greece and
Japan at the time.4 During the same months, Greek entrepreneurs accumulated
considerable profit as suppliers of the Russian navy in the far eastern theatre of war.
These suppliers, together with the members of the Greek community in Russia,
were to provide the main eyewitness accounts of events in Russia. 
As regards the Greek reigning dynasty, the news about the events of 9 January
were very painful, particularly insofar as the Greek queen was concerned. Queen
Olga Konstantinovna, the wife of reigning King George I of Greece, was the
daughter of Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, Alexander II’s elder brother.
According to her son, Prince Nicholas, Olga was a fanatical monarchist.5 She had
very little sympathy for “the new democratic institutions” and was shocked at the
very idea of granting a Constitution in her native country. As pointedly put by
Iu.Ia Solov´ev in his Memoirs, “I remember her utter astonishment when I told her
that a Constitution was absolutely necessary […] and I got the distinct impression
that she regarded me as something of a revolutionary.”6
In contrast, Greek society was positively inclined towards the Russian
expressions of popular will, as shown by its enthusiastic support of the peaceful
demonstration under priest Gapon and the demands of the demonstrators for civil
liberties, a Constitution and labour legislation. As for the high-handed and violent
reaction of the Russian authorities, it was condemned without much ado. 
In January, the Greek press followed closely the heated discussions in the
French Assembly on foreign policy and the Franco-Russian alliance.7 The Greek
press abounded in reports about the impact of the Russian events in other countries
and especially on the staging of antitsarist demonstrations in Paris, Prague, Cracow,
Trieste and elsewhere.8 In Athens, a small group close to the prosocialist newspaper
Metarythmisis [Reform] called the people to similar demonstrations.9 However, the
authoritative Acropolis and its owner, the liberal Vlassis Gavrilides, the father of
4. Iu.Ia. Solov´ev, Vospominaniia diplomata, 1893-1922, Moscow: Izdatel´stvo sotsial´no-
ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1959, pp. 137-138.
5. Prince Nicholas, Ta peninda chronia tis zois mou [The fifty years of my life], Greka-
K.G. Kotzias, Athens, 1926, p. 57.
6. Iu.Ia. Solov´ev, op. cit., p. 142.
7. See in lieu of example the discussions in the French Assembly, including the speech by
Delcassé, in Scrip, 19 January 1905, p. 1.
8. On the impact of the Russian Revolution in Paris and the anti-tsarist demonstration there, see
details in Scrip, 17 January 1905, p. 5.
9. See Scrip, 31 January 1905, p. 4.
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Greek journalism, cautioned the excited Greek public not to follow the example of
the mass public demonstrations in the rest of Europe in support of the victims of
Bloody Sunday. His main thrust was the following: “One of our main liberators,
one of our main great friends, has been none other than Russia. And it was not the
Russia of the nihilists…, nor the Russia of the labour demonstrations, but the
official Russia, the Russia of Tsars Alexander I, Nicholas I, Alexander II and
Nicholas II. Russia is one of the great powers of today, one of the great powers of
tomorrow… [hence] we cannot permit ourselves to react with hostility in the
present difficult circumstances in which our coreligionist and great benefactor finds
herself, taking for granted the tsar’s proclivity to liberalism.”10
Clearly, the national interest of a small dependent state like Greece called for
prudence. The Russian Empire was one of the pillars of the existing Eurocentric
system of states and one of the guarantors of Greece’s independence. Matters were
particularly delicate, for at that historical point (around 1905), Greece was in the
throws of its irredentist campaign in Ottoman Macedonia and in so doing
aggravated Greece’s relations with her old rival Bulgaria (the other main contender
in the region). In Greek eyes, Russia was regarded as the main supporter, if not the
instigator, of Bulgarian assertiveness in Macedonia. This, together with the
traditional Greco-Russian rivalry in the patriarchates of the East (Anthioch,
Jerusalem, Alexandria), was not conducive to warm feelings on the part of the
Greeks towards Russia at the time. On the other hand, Russia’s stance on the Cretan
question (with St. Petersburg consistently pro-Greek) was duly appreciated. All in
all, Russia’s position from Crete to Macedonia on to Asia Minor and to the Near
East was of utmost significance for Greece under its grandiose Megali Idea (Greek
irredentism, from its more modest rendition of acquiring Crete, all the Aegean
islands, Epirus and most of Macedonia, to far more ambitious schemes leading to
the gates of Constantinople and to Smyrna and the Asia Minor coastline), and
called for delicate diplomatic manoeuvring and balancing acts on the part of
Athens. Thus, the guideline to foreign policy behaviour had to be based on political
realism and not idealism or bouts of sentimentalism.  
In spite of this call for Realpolitik, the main thrust in the moderate Greek press
was that the Greeks could not but be supportive of the forces in Russia seeking
reform. After all, as Gavrilides put it, “the Greeks cannot but hope that the benefits
of political freedom can also be enjoyed by the Great Russian nation.”11 As in the
rest of Europe, the liberal discourse in Greece (of whatever hue or tendency)
compared the Russian Empire to the Ottoman Empire, and had concluded as early
as the nineteenth century that the bureaucratic, authoritarian regime of the tsars was
completely out of tune with “the civilised European nations.” Reforms were thus
seen as necessary if Russia was to abandon her “awful despotism” and her image as
10. See [Gavrilides], Acropolis, 20 January 1905, p. 1.
11. Ibid. 
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“a prison for its  peoples” and thus gain her rightful place within Europe as a
progressive and liberal civil state.12 
Within this framework, one of the main questions posed in the Greek press was:
how could reforms come about more smoothly and effectively? Should they come
about from above or should they spring from below? And will the former suffice
and if not, what were the dangers of reforms from below, which would undoubtedly
be far more sweeping and probably violently imposed? And what of the entry of the
masses into politics and how could one realize this otherwise legitimate goal in an
orderly fashion? The Russian predicament gave ample ground for discussions
relevant to Greece herself, at a time when there was considerable soul-searching in
the wake of the humiliating defeat of the country in the Greek-Ottoman war of
1897.
At this point, it is worth noting that the constitutional monarchy of Greece was
one of a handful to have been established worldwide until then (in the Greek case
following the brief 1864 uprising). From then on and in spite of the occasional
intrusion of the monarch in politics, Greece did not lapse into dictatorial or
autocratic rule until well into the 1920s (and mainly in the second part of the
1930s). Furthermore, the civil and political liberties were well established and so
was universal (male) suffrage (note that the latter was not the case in many a
European country in the 1860s). As for the Greek monarchy, it had often been
criticized, and rightly so, for its arbitrary, at times authoritarian, behaviour, but it
remained, until the beginning of World War I, a stable basis of authority, and the
king symbolized the unity of the nation.13 
However, following the aforementioned 1897 humiliation, a drastic change in
the rules of the game was seen as inevitable and necessary. Revolutionary change
by the use of violence en masse was considered a possibility but it gained few
adherents. The esteemed politician Stephanos Dragoumis regarded the political
situation as unruly and conducive to events such as those taking place in Russia (in
1905). According to Dragoumis, in Russia “the people revolted in order to gain
freedoms. Here, they may resort to the same means in order to regain freedoms that
are being trodden upon” and he expressed the hope that things would change to the
better as soon as possible, so as to avoid a wholesale overturn that could be
disastrous to the country.14  
Early reforms and peaceful evolutionary change were basic values for Greece’s
political culture in the first years of the twentieth century. They were the mark of
progress and development.15 According to the prevailing view at the time, changes
12. Ibid. Also by the same author, I Ellas kai o Panslavismos [Greece and Pan-Slavism],
Athens, 1869; Embros, 12 January 1905, p. 1; “I apolytarchia” [Absolutism], Scrip, 14 January
1905, p. 1; “I Rossia kai i Tourkia” [Russia and Turkey], Scrip, 20 January 1905, p. 1.
13. G.B. Dertilis, Istoria tou ellinikou kratous, 1830-1920 [History of the Greek state, 1830-
1920], Athens: Hestia, 2005, vol. 1, 2.
14. “O kyrios Dragoumis provlepon epanastasin” [Mr Dragoumis forecasts revolution],
Acropolis, 2 November 1905, p. 1.
15. G.B. Dertilis, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 763-766.
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had to be initiated or readily accepted by governments. Otherwise, people would
take up arms, and if they did so and “demolished Bastilles”, then the outcome could
be frightening.16 
Even though popular demands and mobilizations may be justified in a particular
time and place, reform by the state itself (the party nominally responsible for
reform) should always be the best option so as to prevent these demands from
becoming uncontrollable and causing violence and political upheaval. Under the
reigning spirit at the time in Greece (contrary to what was to take place from the
1920s onward), the triptych “monarchy-liberalism-reform,” even radical reform as
in the enlightened example of Alexander II, was not seen as controversial and
contradictory for a monarchy.17 In the Russian case, the road to liberalism was seen
as beneficial not only to the Russian people but also to the monarchy itself, as in the
case of Germany some years back.18 
Within such a context, revolution was often used in the same sense as reform,
whereby the masses participated peacefully in a reform instigated from above. The
role of the leader-monarch — in this case, that of Nicholas II — was regarded as
crucial. The tsar had to adopt reform swiftly and implement it gradually. He had to
seize the opportunity and adopt the liberal line, thereby curbing the excesses of the
revolutionary movement while at the same time modernizing the country. This
middle road, which was adopted at the time in Britain by the defender of an Anglo-
Russian rapprochement W.T. Stead, was the lead followed by most Greek press
articles.19 The institutional role of the monarch was not put in doubt, and the real
and symbolic role of the monarchy in the person of Nicholas II was left
untarnished, though he was depicted as inexperienced, weak, perhaps naive. In the
first instance he was seen as rational, full of good sense, with a genuine sympathy
for the struggling people. This image of the fatherly monarch was well established
in the Greek public.20 According to this line, the reasons for the existing strains
between Nicholas II and the people were to be found mainly in the corrupt imperial
court and the backward Holy Synod and above all in the non-credibility and inertia
of the bureaucracy, which was hardly inspired by a sense of social duty but acted in
a self-serving manner, while the government for its part was not in the position to
control it. 
As the events unfolded, the tsar was increasingly criticized for his lack of
resolve and open-mindedness, his inability to implement the promised reforms, and
for having become in effect “hostage” to the imperial court and the bureaucracy.
16. “I epanastasis en Rosia” [The Revolution in Russia], Embros, 18 October 1905, p. 1.
17. [Gavrilides], Acropolis, 20 January 1905, p.1.; “I Rossia kai i Tourkia” [Russia and
Turkey], Scrip, 20 January 1905, p.1; Ch. Andriotis (a Greek from Odessa), “I katastasis eis tin
Rosian. Oi apolytarchikoi kai oi phileleftheroi” [The situation in Russia: The absolutists and
the liberals], Acropolis, 12 December 1905, p. 2.
18. Scrip, 20 January 1905, p. 1.
19. See articles by Stead translated into Greek, in Acropolis, 3 and 4 November 1905.
20. [Gavrilides], Acropolis, 20 January 1905, p. 1. See also Embros, 13 January 1905, p. 4;
“Eksoteriki epitherorisis” [International review] Scrip, 16 January 1905, pp. 1-2. 
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Nicholas’ image was gradually tarnished. He was regarded as lacking not only in
courage, but also in perceptiveness, as was the case with Louis XVI on the eve of
the French Revolution, whose predicament should be a lesson to all absolute
monarchs. Thus, by the last months of 1905, the Greek press began to regard the
tsar himself as one of the causes of the revolutionary unrest. 
Following the pogrom against the Jews, two more inhibiting factors were added
to the ability of the tsar to make bold and far-reaching decisions. These were,
according to the Greek press, the ultraconservative circles within the tsar’s own
ranks on the one hand, and the sinister right-wing opposition to the tsar on the other.
The activity of the counter-revolutionary “Black Hundreds,” responsible for the
pogrom, was deemed criminal and a calculated provocation aiming at forcing the
tsar to resort to extreme measures. 
In spite of the negative aspects of the Revolution, such as the many wanton acts
of violence, the Greek press anticipated that “the river would not go back onto its
course,” and what would eventually come about at the end would be a new,
different, and transformed Russia which made an important step forward towards
greater freedom and progress. 
Socialism, the internal enemy
The political dimension of the crisis and the political system were the main areas of
concern in Greece. The national question, as one of the reasons for the uprising in
Russia, did not go unnoticed, particularly the revolutionary nationalist movements in
Poland and Finland. However, the prospect of secession was considered destabilising
for the international environment and not supported by the Greeks. Apparently, at this
historical juncture, the Greeks, a product of secession themselves from another
empire, chose not to identify with other “chained nations” seeking liberation.  
Apart from the political dimension, the social question and particularly the labour
issue also attracted attention. The workers’ demands were meticulously presented in
the Greek press (references to the corresponding demands of the peasants are far
more sparse), and were considered justified; the need for labour legislation was seen
as important, at the very least as a palliative measure aimed at preventing social
unrest in Russia. It is within this context that the repressive measures were
evaluated, such as the ban on strikes; who was to be responsible for containing
strikes (the army or a special police designed to quell internal threats to security);
and the level of violence that could be acceptable under dire circumstances (here the
question of the proportionality of the violent reaction by the state arose).21
By October 1905, the daily reports on events, the details on the clashes, the
constant descriptions of bloodbaths, atrocities perpetrated by the revolutionaries
and the repressive violence of the “state of the Cossacks,” created a constant
21. Scrip, 16 January 1905, p. 4; “I epanastasis en Rosia” [The Revolution in Russia], Embros,
18 October 1905, p. 1.
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narrative of a revolution that had lapsed into chaos and anarchy, as a bloodstained
strife now threatening to engulf the rest of Europe. By November and December
1905, the descriptions in the press became gloomier and apocalyptic, as the new
wave of mobilizations increasingly brought in the more radical and leftist groups
and parties such as the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks and the S.R. By now, the Greek
press equated the Revolution with “darkness.”
 Following the tsarist manifesto of October 1905, the disturbances were regarded
as without purpose, leading inevitably to a deadlock, to an insidious “war of all
against all.” Reports and interpretations of events became ambiguous and
contradictory: did the tsar really grant a Constitution, was the Constitution in
question worth anything, would it be implemented, would universal suffrage be
applied and, above all, were the people indeed able to overthrow absolutism or did
they gain very little in return? However, the overall feeling in Greece at the time was
that the tsar had given in considerably to the demands of the popular movement. 
According to the Greek press, those responsible for the continuing chaos were
the Russian “extreme” liberals who got carried away making “extremely
democratic demands, the likes of which were badly received, even by truly free and
civilized nations [meaning the French and the British].”22 By doing so, they were
responsible, together with the socialists, for the continuing anarchy and violence
among the popular strata.23 One of the common adages of the Greek press was that
the Russian people could not be compared with the other European peoples,
including the Greeks, for it was immature and did not have the faintest idea of what
freedom really stood for and what was the meaning of a responsible use of freedom
for the good of the nation and state.24 For instance, the call for universal (male)
suffrage by the “extreme liberals” was regarded as exaggerated—a view
incidentally voiced by the London Times on the same grounds—for it would have
amounted to its being applied to some 80 million people, nine tenths of which were
peasants, almost all of them illiterate.25
The Greek mainstream journalistic discourse was of the opinion that the
continuation of the mobilisations, and in particular the uprising in Moscow,
relegated the Russian people to the level of a mob misguided by the nihilists, the
anarchists, and the socialists, who were seen as the other end of the terrorist
spectrum to the ultra-right-wing “Black Hundreds.” Interestingly, the socialists
were not seen as genuine reformers, but as selfish destroyers of everything they
could lay their hands on. Under their guidance, the strikes and other activities of the
revolutionaries lost their value as just and justified demands and became mere
agitations. This could only lead to anarchy, where the very essence of fundamental
freedoms would be in jeopardy, and several concrete rights would suffer, such as
the right to property or the right to free trade. The labour and socialist movements
22. Acropolis, 14 December 1905, p. 3.
23. Ibid. 
24. Embros, 30 October 1905, p. 4.
25. Embros, 3 November 1905, p. 4.
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were further denigrated in an array of reports about murders, atrocities and even
sacrileges allegedly committed by their members.26
The dominant view in Greece was that the labour movement was the ultimate
internal enemy of Russia, and European societies as well, particularly when it
joined hands with socialism.27 In the conservative and liberal Greek milieu of the
early twentieth century, socialism was seen as social evil, a threat to the
achievements of civilised European nations.
This labelling of socialism as an evil is hardly surprising, for in those days there
existed no socialist party in Greece. It was to be created more than a decade later, in
the aftermath of World War I, in 1918. This fear of socialism was “imported” from
without, from Europe of course.28 Furthermore, in the beginning of the twentieth
century, Greek society was equipped with weak civil structures and a relatively
small proletariat, whose movement was still at an embryonic stage, and there was no
mass agrarian movement either. Indeed, the Greeks prided themselves on being a
society with limited class differences, by and large egalitarian, by comparison to the
rest of Europe. This theoretical lack of class antagonisms had become an ideal that
had to be maintained at all cost. According to the prevailing Greek narrative, it was
precisely this virtue of Hellenism, this recipe for social harmony which
differentiated Greek society from the far more turbulent and unruly European
experience.29 The Greeks were very sensitive on this issue, for it was precisely then,
in the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century, that Greek society became
cognizant of the emergence of the wider social question and of the inclusion of hired
labour in the fabric of society. It was then that professional unions and workers’
organizations made their first appearance and very soon gained the status of
autonomous actors, a development that made the established authorities noticeably
wary. Thus, the public discussion about what was going on in Russia, with the
strikes, the barricades, the strong presence of the socialists and workers, gave ample
ground for discussing the Greek experience and the obvious new challenge facing
the country: the social question, which had been dormant until then. 
As we have seen, in Greece, the 1905 Revolution was an example of a process of
change worth avoiding, not least because mass participation on the part of the people
was bound to get out of hand, leading to chaos and disaster. However, only two years
later, this paradigm regarding “1905” was to come under attack, as a rival new
paradigm began to appear, which for the first time placed the pervasive “national
26. Embros, 3 November 1905, p. 4; Acropolis, 4 December 1905, p. 3; “I epanastasis en
Rosia” [The Revolution in Russia], Embros, 18 October 1905, p. 1; The daily Scrip, from
January onwards, puts great emphasis on the rise of socialism and the dangers of socialist
propaganda. See e.g. Scrip, 16 January 1905, p. 4. 
27. Scrip, 21 January 1905, p. 3. 
28. Antonis Liakos, “I proslipsi tou marxismou stin Ellada” [The perception of Marxism in
Greece] in G.B. Dertilis & K. Kostis, eds., Themata Neoellenikis istorias (18os-19os aionas)
[Issues in contemporary Greek history, 18th-19th centuries], Athens: Sakkoulas, 1991,
pp. 405-416.
29. Christos Hatziosif (ed.), Istoria tis Ellados tou 20ou aiona, 1900-1922 [History of Greece in
the 20th century, 1900-1922], Athens: Vivliorama, 2000, vol. 1, pp. 9-40.
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question” (Greek irredentism, the backbone and raison d’être of the little kingdom
since the 1850s) in the context of and interaction with, the social question. This new
twist provided the impetus for treating the 1905 Russian Revolution in a different
light. The main triggering event for this reappraisal was the publication of a seminal
booklet entitled To koinoniko mas zitima [Our social question] by Yiorgos Skliros.
Skliros, a Greek of the Diaspora who had studied in St. Petersburg and Germany, put
to task the conventional wisdom on the “classlessness” of Greek society, questioning
both its actual existence and the view that it was an ideal situation. Skliros, who was
apparently influenced by the views of Plekhanov, treated class struggle, in Greece
and elsewhere, as a necessary ingredient of progress. In his treatise, Skliros places the
1905 Russian Revolution within the context of a series of European bourgeois
revolutions, starting with the French Revolution of 1789, the French revolutions of
1830 and 1848, the German revolutions of 1848 and so on. The Russian 1905
Revolution is placed within the progressive evolution of humanity from one historical
stage to the next, from feudalism to capitalism, on to socialism.30 
“The land of the riddles”
The Greek reports and comments on the 1905 Revolution have another aspect to
them worth highlighting, namely negative and orientalist overtones. The majority
of the Greek public at the time was of the view that revolution and socialism were
social evils, wherever they came together. However, for the Greeks, as for most
Europeans, whenever such events took place in Russia, they were likely to get
considerably out of hand. The reason for this malaise was that they simply took
place in what was not a fully civilised country.31 Particularly in the months of
November and December 1905, the Revolution was likened to a monster eating its
own flesh. Accordingly, the Russian revolutionaries could hardly be compared with
the French revolutionaries of 1789, not least because the Russians clamouring and
struggling were not the true offspring of liberty and equality.32  
According to many a press report, the backward, naive, zealot Russian people
thirsted for blood, as was the case with “medieval fanaticism.” For instance, one of
the writers in Acropolis goes on to argue that the understanding of these events is
30. G. Skliros, Erga [Works], L. Axelos, ed., Athens, pp. 106-108. Rena Stauridi-Patrikiou, O
G.Skliros stin Aigypto. Sosialismos, dimotikismos, kai metarythmisi [G.Skliros in Egypt:
Socialism, demoticism and reform], Athens: Themelio, 1988.
31. For the European perception of Russia, see Bruno Naarden, Socialist Europe and
Revolutionary Russia. Perception and Prejudice, 1848-1923, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992, especially chapter 4 ; Iver Neumann, Uses of the Other. “The East” in
European Identity Formation, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
32. See e.g. “I Rosia nikosa tin Rosia. Epanastasis i anarchia, pio to telos?” [Russia overcoming
Russia. Revolution or anarchy, what will the end be?], Acropolis, 4 December 1905, p. 3;
“Psychikai meletai is tin simerinin Rosian” [Psychic studies in today’s Russia], Acropolis, 21
and 22 November 1905, p. 3. The comparison of the Russian Revolution with the French
Revolution is a constant theme in the Greek press, which needs extensive study in its own right.
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neither the work of the sociologist, nor of the historian, but of the medical doctor,
this in view of the fact that “the brain of the Russian people” can absorb information
only if it can be transformed into inviolable and sacrosanct religious truths; hence
the Russians were deep down incapable of enjoying the fruits of liberty.33 
These interpretations, often imbued with racism, follow well-established Greek
and European stereotypes regarding Russia and the Russians. Russia, be it in revolt
or not, was seen as unique and not comparable with any other country in the
civilised world. Its religious fanaticism pointed to its dubious European credentials.
Even the image of priest Gapon, however heroic and positive (not least in making
the cross a symbol of the quest for political liberties), is being used to highlight the
religious and zealot character of Russian society, the very antithesis of progress. 
There were also several descriptions of Russia by European authors of the time,
such as the work of the German Hugo Ganz, entitled The Land of the Riddles:
Russia of Today, an excellent description of Russia and the Russian people, which
was published in successive editions in the daily Embros, starting in January 1905.
In this work, Russia’s European credentials are seen as ambivalent. The discourse
is semi-Orientalist,34 based on the well-known dichotomy of the Enlightenment
between civilisation and barbarism, European and non-European. Within this
bipolarity, Russia is somewhere in between, having a dual character, partly
European and civilised and partly backward, semibarbarian and Asiatic. 
This line of thinking was very much in evidence in Athens in 1905. It followed a
long tradition prevalent in Europe since the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars,
which tended to stress the negative and darker sides of Russian life in western
European eyes. Apart from the writings of what could be dubbed Russo-phobic
literature, such as the well-known book by the Marquis de Custine, Russia in 1939,
and the notorious “Testament of Peter the Great” (a proven forgery), paradoxically
even the works of Russian authors greatly admired in the rest of Europe and Greece
were often cited as evidence of Russia’s backwardness, semi-European character
and uniqueness, instead of being read simply as works of genius and sophistication
and as an unmistakable evidence of Russia’s place in Europe and world civilisation.
The works of Pushkin, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and contemporary writers such as
Gorky and Kuprin came to be cited as authoritative evidence of Russia’s negative
traits: one needed only to refer to the vivid descriptions and scathing criticisms of
domination, suffering, poverty, hunger, illiteracy, and corruption found in these
classic works. Thus, for instance, Dostoevsky’s poetic and passionate depiction of
the noble “Russian soul” was “translated” in foreign environments negatively, as
the “simple folk, easily manipulated by shrewd self-serving agitators.”35 
However, to be fair, this was not the only portrayal of Russia in 1905, when it
came to its writers and other major figures of the arts and letters, be it in Greece or in
33. Acropolis, 21 November 1905, p. 3. 
34. On the terms “semi-Orientalist” see Larry Wolff , Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of
Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.
35. Embros, 13 January 1905, p. 2.
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the rest of Europe. Maxim Gorky (an active supporter at the time of the 1905
Revolution) and all the major figures of the nineteenth century, including the
celebrated composers, presented a flourishing and vibrant Russia, which though
distinct, was certainly European.36 As Skrip put it, “the great Russian people, heroes
in war, powerful in the sciences, in the arts and in life, powerful in their racial blood,
strive to make their flowers blossom even more now with the air of freedom.”37
Harking back to basics: The pan-Slavic spectre
As we have seen, the Greek press and public were favourable to reforms, though
wary of the excesses of violence on both sides. The press was silent, at least
momentarily, on the almost paranoiac Greek fear of Russian pan-Slavism in the
Balkans. But this was to be only a brief interlude. The year 1905 was hardly over
when the old reflexes came back to haunt the Greek public, with the spectre of
Russian pan-Slavism, in its role as the imagined awesome threat from the north. In
Greek eyes, the vehicle for Russia’s “pan-Slavic designs” was none other than
Bulgaria, Greece’s main foe and antagonist at the time in Macedonia and Thrace
within the even wider scheme of Greek irredentism.    
For the Greek national discourse of the time (as well as before, from the 1880s
onwards), the important internal changes of the Russian Empire, be they liberal or
not, amounted to very little, at least in the main areas of concern for the Greeks.
Russia, be it under the tsar or the liberals, was bound to remain anti-Greek as far as
the “Greek rights” in the Balkans and the Near East were concerned. As put by
D. Anastasopoulos (a well-known and frequent commentator in the Greek press) in
1906: “Let us not delude ourselves! Tsarism does not easily crumble, contrary to
the belief of the patriots shouting in Athens […] and even if absolutism were to
change to a liberal constitutional monarchy, its policy toward the East (Balkans,
Ottoman Empire) would remain unchanged. Pan-Slavism is for Russia a force that
is deeply engrained in the genuine pure nature of the Russian psyche.”38 
Professor Neoklis Kazazis of the University of Athens, a long-standing critic of
Russia’s nihilism and expansionist foreign policy along pan-Slavist lines,39 reached
a similar conclusion a year later, combining Russian nihilism, with anarchism and
pan-Slavism. According to Kazazis, Russia was immune to the influences of the
industrial revolution, of liberalism or of economic and political progress. It can
only absorb nihilistic and revolutionary tendencies within its racially determined
36. See e.g. the article on Maxim Gorky adapted from the French daily Le Matin, in Scrip,
27 January 1905, p. 1; Andriotis, op.cit., Acropolis, 12 January 1905, p. 1. 
37. Scrip, 18 January 1905, p. 1. 
38. D. Anastasopoulos, Panslavistai, oi megaloi ehthrei tou genous [Pan-Slavists, the great
enemies of the Greek race], Athens, 1906, p. 20.
39. See Neoklis Kazasis, “O midenismos en Rosia” [Nihilism in Russia], Parnassos, 12 December
1879.
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pan-Slavic ideology. Consequently, the Russians are inherently against the
inviolable rights of the Greeks in Macedonia and against the Greek presence and
influence in the Christian East.40 
*  *  *
To conclude, the 1905 Russian Revolution was a central theme in the Greek public
discourse at a time when the feeling was spreading in Greece that the end of a
historical period was approaching and a new era in the history of Hellenism was
about to dawn.  
The perceptions of the Russian Revolution of 1905 by the Greek public were, as
we have seen, multilayered, fluid, often contradictory, depending on the historical
moment and the vicissitudes of Russia. They were also moulded by the various
European discourses about the events in Russia and the political and social situation
in Greece herself and not least by the Greek national stereotypes regarding Russia
and the Russians. Furthermore, the Russian experience triggered discussion on the
following dilemma: whether more democratisation was appropriate in Greece or
the opposite was more preferable.
As Eric Hobsbawm has pointed out, from 1890 to 1910, no European government
seriously contemplated doing away with its Constitution or parliamentary system of
government.41 Nevertheless, there was a number of open questions that gave rise to
many a heated debate. They included the political system, parliamentarism versus
antiparliamentarism, the main elements of government, the rights of the individual,
electoral rights, the demand for universal suffrage, popular representation, the control
of bureaucracy, the proper role of political parties, socialism and communism, the
labour question, the legitimisation of the use of force internally, be it by the state (the
legitimate use of violence) or by revolutionary or nationalist movements, in the name
of democracy or self-determination. 
Our essay was confined almost exclusively to the perceptions of the 1905
Revolution during that very year in Greece. Cleary, another issue worth studying is
the perceptions and use of “1905” in the public and political discourse within a
wider time span and in conjunction with the catalyst date “1917”, the “ten days that
shook the world.”
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